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THESES
•	Russia	has	been	dealing	with	an	economic	crisis	since	the	beginning	of	2015.	
It	has	chiefly	affected	the	Russian	public	who	need	to	cope	with	the	most	seri-
ous	decline	in	real	incomes	since	1998.	Public	finances	have	also	been	serious-
ly	affected:	the	worst	problem	for	the	government	is	the	need	to	find	sources	
for	to	plug	the	budget	gap,	with	dwindling	revenues	from	the	export	of	raw	
materials	and	reserves,	and	limited	access	to	foreign	loans.	In	turn,	the	reces-
sion	has	relatively	mildly	affected	the	real	sphere	of	the	economy,	according	
to	data	showing	 the	dynamics	of	 the	 fall	of	GDP	and	 industrial	production.
•	The	crisis	is	not	so	much	a	consequence	of	the	current	difficulties	caused	by	
the	slump	on	international	raw	material	markets	as	proof	of	a	serious	dys-
function	of	the	model	of	economic	governance	adopted	by	the	Russian	gov-
ernment	–	a	model	skewed	towards	the	individual	interests	of	the	power	
elite.	The	systemic	nature	of	the	crisis	has	been	revealed	in	governmental	
forecasts:	even	though,	according	to	them,	the	recession	will	end	in	2017,	it	
is	expected	to	be	followed	by	a	long-lasting	stagnation	(perhaps	even	two	
decades-long).	
•	This	means	that	the	present	crisis	significantly	differs	from	the	econom-
ic	crises	which	affected	Russia	in	the	past.	The	existing	problems	are	not	
a	transitional	phenomenon;	they	determine	 ‘the	new	normal’	which	will	
last	for	many	years	and	will	be	characterised	by	a	constant	lack	of	devel-
opment	perspectives.	The formal end of the recession will thus not be 
equivalent to the end of the crisis of the economic model. Instead there 
will only be a transition from the acute to the chronic phase charac-
terised above all by a gradual and unstoppable degradation of the Rus-
sian economy and the living standards of the Russian public. This is 
so because it is impossible to guarantee stable, economic growth of 
several per cent without extensive and painful system reforms.
•	However,	the	political	nature	of	the	sources	of	the	crisis	makes	it	signifi-
cantly	more	 difficult	 to	 overcome	 its	 consequences,	 because	 the	 govern-
ment	has	no	desire	to	overhaul	the	present	model	of	state	governance.	Their	
priorities	include	maintaining	control	over	political	and	social	life	and	re-
gaining	Russia’s	 superpower	 status	 on	 the	 international	 arena.	Econom-
ic	development	 is	 thus	given	a	 lower	priority,	and	the	 tactical	anti-crisis	
measures	taken	by	the	government	are	predominantly	for	the	sake	of	ap-
pearances	and	intended	to	serve	political	and	propaganda	goals.	
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•	Paradoxically,	this	tactic	has	a	great	chance	of	success	in	the	next	2–3	years:	
the	 economic	 crisis	will	 not	 become	 an	 independent	 catalyst	 of	 a	 politi-
cal	 crisis.	The	 likelihood	of	massive	public	protests	 is	very	 low,	which	 is	
an	effect	of	both	 the	paternalistic	mentality	and	atomisation	of	 the	Rus-
sian	public,	as	well	as	their	fear	of	repressions.	A	mutiny	inside	the	elite,	
who	strongly	identify	themselves	with	Putin’s	system,	is	equally	unlikely	
despite	the	 limited	opportunities	to	build	their	personal	fortunes	during	
a	crisis.	
•	In	the	longer	term,	the	Kremlin	will	face	serious	challenges	resulting	from	
both	budget	problems	and	possible	errors	in	diagnosing	and	forecasting	the	
social	situation.	However,	if	one	assumes	that	the	Russian	government	will	
refrain	from	hasty	moves	that	might	destabilise	the	socio-political	situa-
tion	in	the	country	and	that	the	international	community	will	spare	Russia	
serious	turbulence,	the	probability	of	major	threats	to	the	government	elite	
seems	 low.	Russia’s	most	 serious	problem	will	be	 long-lasting	 stagnation	
and	a	worsening	backwardness	when	compared	to	developed	countries.	
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I. From rEcESSIon To STagnaTIon – THE courSE and 
THE dynamIcS oF THE EconomIc crISIS In ruSSIa
Russia has been struggling with recession since 2015. This is the fourth 
serious economic crisis in this country in the past 25 years. Proof	of	the	
crisis	include	the	macroeconomic	results	for	2015–2016:	the	fall	in	GDP	and	
industrial	production,	the	decrease	in	people’s	real	incomes	and	wages,	and	
inflation.	Consumer	spending	(this	accounts	for	50%	of	GDP)	and	investments	
(which	cover	a	further	20%	of	GDP)	have	decreased,	and	the	decline	in	foreign	
direct	investment,	which	are	essential	for	development	perspectives,	has	been	
dramatic1.	
Chart 1. The dynamics of GDP, industrial production and real disposable 
income of the population year-on-year 
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2012
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
2013 2014 2015 2016
[%]
GDP industrial
production 
disposable
income 
n/a
Data on GDP growth may be substantially revised due to the modification of the methodology applied by 
Rosstat.
Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from Rosstat (ww.gks.ru).
1	 According	to	UNCTAD,	in	2015	(no	data	for	2016	is	available)	it	fell	by	as	much	as	92%	against	
2014	figures.	Furthermore,	the	influx	of	FDI	to	Russia	in	2014	was	more	than	three	times	
lower	than	in	2013.
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Although	most	of	these	phenomena	suggest	that	the	recession	(in	the	strict	
meaning	of	the	term)	began	in	the	first	months	of	2015,	when	Russia’s	economic	
problems	were	fully	laid	bare,	clear tendencies for crisis had been growing 
already from the second half of 2014. They	were	above	all	an	effect	of:	a	sig-
nificant	drop	in	oil	prices,	the	consequences	of	the	Western	financial	sanctions	
imposed	on	Russia	in	July	2014	and	the	fall	in	the	value	of	the	rouble.	Coupled	
with	the	mistakes	made	by	the	Russian	Central	Bank	(including	lengthy	and	
unsuccessful	attempts	to	maintain	the	value	of	the	rouble	at	its	previous	level	at	
the	expense	of	a	significant	reduction	of	foreign	currency	reserves)	and	specu-
lation	on	the	Russian	currency	market,	all	this	led	to	an	accumulation	of	the	
negative	phenomena	observed	in	December	2014.	This	resulted	in	the	collapse	
of	the	rouble	which	in	turn	led	to	the	deterioration	of	the	financial	situation	of	
Russian	banks,	companies	and	citizens2.	
Chart 2. Dynamics of Urals oil prices and the dollar exchange rate 
(in 2014–beginning of 2017)
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Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of 
the Russian Federation (www.minfin.ru, www.cbr.ru) 
2	 For	more	information	on	the	crisis	in	December	2014	see:	The	economic	and	financial	crisis	
in	Russia	–	background,	symptoms	and	prospects	for	the	future, OSW Report,	6	February	
2015,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2015-02-06/economic-and-fi-
nancial-crisis-russia-background-symptoms-and
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Chart 3. The Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves (in 2014–beginning of  2017)
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Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
(www.cbr.ru) 
The major fall in oil prices has proven durable and it has had the strongest 
direct effect on the deterioration of the macroeconomic indicators leading	
to	a	reduction	of	revenues	from	oil	exports	and	the	depreciation	of	the	Russian	
currency.	This	in	turn	increased	the	costs	of	both	imports	and	the	servicing	of	
foreign	debt3.	The situation worsened due to the Western financial sanc-
tions imposed	on	Russia	in	July	2014	in	response	to	its	military	aggression	in	
Ukraine.	They	weakened	the	rouble	further	still,	but	above	all	they	significantly	
reduced	the	opportunities	for	Russian	entities	to	acquire	new	foreign	loans	and	
to	refinance	their	previous	debts.	Although	the	direct	impact	of	the	sanctions	
has	diminished	over	time4,	their	indirect	and	informal	effect	can	still	be	felt	
(this	concerns	even	those	Russian	entities,	including	the	Treasury,	on	which	
no	direct	 sanctions	have	been	 imposed5).	The	 international	 rating	agencies	
3	 In	2015,	revenues	from	oil	exports	fell	by	over	40%	to	less	than	US$90	billion,	compared	to	
almost	US$154	billion	in	2014.	Between	January	and	November	2016,	they	reached	US$66.4	
billion	(a	20.3%	year-on-year	fall).	Incomes	were	falling	despite	the	growing	volume	of	oil	
exported	every	year	(by	almost	9.5%	in	2015	and	by	4.9%	in	January-November	2016).	Data	
from	the	Federal	Customs	Service:	www.customs.ru
4	 For	 information	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	 sanctions	 on	 the	 Russian	 economy	 see,	Maria	
Domańska,	Szymon	Kardaś,	The	consequences	of	the	Western	financial	sanctions	on	the	Rus-
sian	 economy,	 OSW Commentary,	 24	 March	 2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2016-03-24/consequences-western-financial-sanctions-russian-economy
5	 In	 February	 2016,	 the	 US	 government	 recommended	 American	 banks	 to	 be	 cautious	
about	 participation	 in	 the	 placement	 of	 Russian	 treasury	 bonds	 since	 they	 might	 be	
used	as	a	 channel	 to	 indirectly	finance	 the	entities	on	 the	sanctions	 list.	A	similar	 recom-
mendation	 addressed	 to	 European	 banks	 was	 included	 in	 unofficial	 statements	 from	
representatives	 of	 institutions	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 in	 March	 2016;	 http://www.wsj.
com/articles/u-s-warns-banks-off-russian-bonds-1456362124;	http://www.rbc.ru/
rbcfreenews/56e-	8813a9a79472d1d86dbcf?from=main
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(S&P	and	Moody’s)	decided	at	the	beginning	of	2015	to	downgrade	Russia’s	credit	
rating	to	the	‘junk’	or	non-investment	level	due	to	the	deterioration	of	its	eco-
nomic	situation	and	international	image	(Fitch	was	the	only	agency	to	leave	
Russia’s	rating	at	the	lowest	investment-grade	level).	Since	the	financial	markets	
are	globalised,	the government has limited possibilities to neutralise eco-
nomic problems by way of the influx of money from other countries (even	
from	those	which	have	not	imposed	sanctions	on	Russia).	
As shown by macroeconomic data, a few characteristic features of the cri-
sis in Russia can be distinguished that	are	especially	visible	in	comparison	
with	the	recession	in	2009.	
First of all, the real sector has so far been affected to a much lower level. 
The	fall	in	GDP	and	industrial	production	is	much	milder	than	in	2009	(then,	
as	a	consequence	of	the	slump	on	international	markets	and	lowering	demand	
for	Russian	raw	materials,	these	indicators	fell	by	7.9%	and	10.8%	respectively6).	
However,	at	the	same	time,	the	tempo	of	overcoming	the	crisis	is	noticeably	
slower;	this	time	the	recession	will	last	for	at	least	two	years	in	aggregate	(there	
was	a	decline	in	GDP	in	2016	year-on-year).	
In	spite	of	the	continuation	of	the	negative	tendencies	in	the	economy, the rela-
tively mild impact of the crisis on the real sector facilitates its	gradual	ad-
aptation to the new conditions. In	2016,	symptoms	of	a	general	improvement	
of	the	situation	in	the	real	sector	were	noticed:	industrial	production	was	falling	
at	a	slower	pace	and	the	losses	incurred	in	2015	were	being	made	up	for7.	This	
happened	both	as	a	consequence	of	austerity	policies	adopted	by	companies	
(including	the	sale	of	foreign	assets)	and	the	government’s	moves:	upholding	
the	decision	of	2014	to	liberalise	the	rouble	exchange	rate	and	giving	up	ideas	to	
regulate	prices	and	to	impose	limitations	on	capital	flow.	There	were	also	visible	
signs	of	moderate	optimism	among	businesspeople	and	the	general	public	as	
regards	the	evaluation	of	the	economic	situation.	This,	though,	is	not	so	much	
proof	of	the	crisis	being	overcome,	but	rather	of	their	getting	used	to	living	in	
crisis	–	this	is	facilitated	above	all	by	the	lack	of	new	serious	market	volatility8.	
6	 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/1/0-0.htm
7	 See	Rosstat	data,	www.gks.ru
8	 See	data	from	VCIOM	public	opinion	polls	and	the	surveys	conducted	by	Markit	agency	for	
August	2016.	See	https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/news/2016/09/05/655693-indeks-
pmi-sferi-uslug-snizilsya;	https://rns.online/consumer-market/Indeks-potrebitelskogo-
doveriya-v-Rossii-v-avguste-viros-do-36-punktov-2016-09-20	
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At the same time, detailed statistical data indicate that the anti-develop-
mental structure of the economy are becoming entrenched through adap-
tation processes; the chances for its modernisation are slim. The	industrial	
production	indicators	are	growing	mainly	owing	to	the	constant	slight	growth	
in	the	primary	sector	resulting	from	the	relatively	stable	(unlike	in	2008–2009)	
demand	for	oil	and	gas	on	international	markets	and	the	unshifting	share	of	
Russian	exports	 in	the	European	oil	and	gas	market9.	 In	turn,	a	significant	
section	of	the	processing	industry	is	struggling	with	recession10.	Although	the	
depreciation	of	the	rouble	has	improved	the	profitability	of	exports	in	some	sec-
tors	which	had	been	generating	very	low	profits	until	recently	(including	the	
chemical	industry11),	many	other	sectors	are	still	in	the	high-risk	group.	This	
concerns	for	example	the	car	industry,	one	of	the	technologically	most	devel-
oped	sectors12.	The	withdrawal	from	investment	plans	caused	by	the	crisis	along	
with	the	low	rouble	exchange	rate	are	ruining	the	chances	for	modernisation	of	
production	by	way	of	imports	of	goods	and	technologies.	At	the	same	time,	the	
dynamics	of	foreign	investments	suggests	that	external	investors	are	sceptical	
about	engagement	on	the	Russian	market.	
However, the consequences of the crisis have most of all affected the 
Russian public, especially	the	poorest	sections	of	society13.	Proof of this 
can be found in the dynamics of the fall in the real disposable incomes 
of the population14.	Thus the recession seen in 2015–2016 radically differs 
9	 See	data	from	the	Ministry	of	Energy	and	the	Central	Bank	concerning	oil	and	gas	exports;	
S. Aleksashenko,	Is	Russia’s	Economy	Doomed	to	Collapse?,	1	July	2016,	http://nationalinter-
est.org/feature/russias-economy-doomed-collapse-16821.	The	 special	 construction	 of	 the	
fiscal	system	also	helps	the	primary	sector.	This	causes	the	decrease	in	oil	and	gas	prices	
to	adversely	affect	above	all	the	revenues	in	the	public	budget,	while	companies’	profits	are	
affected	to	a	lesser	extent.
10	 For	example,	the	growth	seen	in	the	primary	sector	reached	2.5%	in	2016.	In	turn,	the	out-
put	of	the	processing	sector	grew	only	by	0.1%	(in	the	preceding	year	it	fell	by	5.4%	as	com-
pared	to	2014).	
11	 С.	Алексашенко,	Потерянное	дно:	почему	российская	экономика	не	поддержала	опти-
мистов,	28	June	2016,	ww.rbc.ru.	There	was	growth	in	the	chemical	industry	in	both	2015	and	
2016	(by	6.3%	and	5.3%	respectively).	
12	 For	information	on	this	sector’s	problems	on	the	example	of	Avtovaz	see	http://www.rbc.
ru/business/02/06/2016/5750012a9a79479c4b76a950?from=newsfeed.
13	 For	more	 information	 on	 the	 social	 consequences	 of	 the	 crisis	 see:	 Jan	 Strzelecki,	 Pain-
ful	adaptation.	The	social	consequences	of	the	crisis	in	Russia,	OSW Studies,	January	2017;	
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2017-02-06/painful-adaptation-so-
cial-consequences-crisis-russia
14	 After	 the	4%	 fall	 in	2015,	 incomes	 fell	 further	 in	2016	 (by	5.9%	year-on-year),	while	 real	
wages	remained	on	a	level	similar	to	the	level	seen	in	2015	(their	total	annual	reduction	in	
2015	reached	9.5%).
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from the crisis in 2008–2009.	Despite	the	economic	slump,	owing	to	support	
from	the	state	budget,	the	real	income	of	the	population	increased	in	2009	by	
2.3%15.	By	comparison,	during	the	current	crisis,	starting	from	November	
2014,	their	incomes	have	been	constantly	falling,	which	is	the	worst	result	
since	1998.	The	crisis	resulted	in	a	significant	increase	in	the	number	of	poor	
people	whose	incomes	are	lower	than	the	minimum	subsistence	level:	from	
16.1	million	in	2014	to	20.3	million	in	January-September	2016	(13.9%	of	the	
population)16.
The public is feeling the consequences of the crisis in two ways. On the 
one hand, they need to face the consequences of inflation –	both	imported	
goods	and	domestic	production	have	become	more	expensive	as	a	result	of	the	
depreciation	of	the	rouble.	The	factor	which	most	determines	people’s	living	
standards	is	the	level	of	food	prices:	in	2015	it	increased	by	almost	21%	(while	
the	prices	of	some	food	products,	especially	fruit	and	vegetables,	rose	by	over	
40%)17,	and	the	noticeably	slower	price	growth	in	2016	was	mainly	an	effect	of	
the	stabilisation	of	the	rouble	exchange	rate	and	lowering	consumer	demand.	
On the other hand, the public has felt the negative consequences of the 
real sector’s adaptation to crisis conditions. The	austerity	strategies	which	
companies	have	been	applying	include	above	all	reducing	working	hours	and	
wages,	as	well	as	functioning	in	the	grey	economy	(informal	employment	cov-
ers	between	25%	and	40%	workers	in	total18).	Although	more	flexible	employ-
ment	rules	led	to	a	relatively	low	unemployment	level	(5.3%	in	December	2016),	
employees’	sense	of	security	is	weakening.	In	mid-2016,	more	than	60%	of	re-
spondents	feared	they	could	lose	their	jobs,	while	the	number	of	people	who	
have	been	unemployed	for	more	than	12	months	is	growing,	as	is	the	average	
period	of	searching	for	a	job	19.	This	is	one	of	the	reasons	for	the	increase	in	the	
15	 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/1/0-0.htm
16	 http://www.interfax.ru/russia/540505
17	 https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2016/01/13/623761-2015-podorozhali
18	 11.7%	of	them	work	only	in	the	grey	economy.	Data	for	April	–	May	2016.	Н.	Акиндинова,	
Я.	Кузьминов,	Е.	Ясин,	Экономика	России:	перед	долгим	переходом,	апрель	2016;	Bloom-
berg	рассказал	о	желании	Путина	вывести	из	«тени»	30	млн	россиян,	www.rbc.ru
19	 Data	from	RANEPA.	http://www.rbc.ru/society/05/07/2016/577bb8b69a79472d3a128a50;	
http://www.ranepa.ru/images/docs/monitoring/ek-monitoring/monitoring-march-2016.
pdf;	Впервые	за	восемь	лет	расходы	россиян	на	еду	превысили	остальные	расходы,	
19	 April	 2016,	http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/04/19/638228-rashodi-
edu.	For	more	information	on	the	labour	market’s	problems	during	the	crisis	see	Jan	Strze-
lecki,	op. cit.
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number	of	registered	unemployed	since	2015,	which	is	proof	of	the	loss	of	faith	
in	the	possibilities	of	finding	a	new	job	soon	and	of	growing	interest	in	receiving	
even	small	guaranteed	benefits	–	especially	given	the	widely	shared	conviction	
that	the	crisis	will	not	end	soon20.	
The situation is additionally complicated by the lack of budget funds for 
social welfare, which	forces	people	to	implement	individual	‘survival	strate-
gies’	which	envisage	above	all	economising,	sometimes	radically	(for	example,	
around	45%	of	Russians	are	economising	on	food21).	In	contrast	to	the	crisis	in	
2008–2009,	the	government	is	no	longer	able	to	combat	recession	through	huge	
financial	injections	from	the	state	budget.	
The poor situation of the state budget is another essential feature of the 
crisis in 2015–2016.	The	federal	budget	entered	the	present	crisis	in	a	much	
worse	situation	than	in	200822.	The	consistently	low	oil	prices	forced	the	gov-
ernment	to	seriously	amend	the	budget	in	2015	and	2016,	involving	the	adjust-
ment	of	planned	revenue	and	expenditure	to	the	new	price	conditions.	However,	
while	in	2015	the	adjustment	did	not	upset	the	balance	of	the	federal	budget23	
and	while	the	deficit	turned	out	to	be	visibly	smaller	than	planned	(2.6%	as	com-
pared	to	the	expected	3%),	the	way	the	discussion	on	the	budget	in	2016	unfolded	
indicates	that	the	state’s	financial	problems	significantly	deteriorated.	
The	Russian	budget	for	2016	was	initially	constructed	with	the	assumption	that	
the	average	annual	oil	price	will	be	unrealistically	high	(US$50	per	barrel),	
which	was	a	simple	repetition	of	the	assumptions	from	2015,	without	taking	
into	account	the	trends	on	the	raw	material	markets.	It	was	only	the	budget	
amendment	in	November	based	on	the	average	annual	oil	price	at	US$41	per	
barrel	that	reflected	the	market	reality	(the	average	oil	price	in	2016	reached	
US$41.9).	Budget	revenues	were	also	falling,	to	a	great	extent	as	a	result	of	low	
20	 Over	60%	of	respondents	estimate	that	it	will	 last	for	at	 least	a	year;	http://www.levada.
ru/2016/09/26/krizis-i-ozhidaniya-uvolnenij/.	 For	 information	 on	 the	 increase	 of	 regis-
tered	unemployment	see	www.gks.ru	
21	 This	 indicator	 is	 three	 times	higher	 than	a	year	earlier.	Survey	conducted	by	Romir	agen-
cy,	 data	 for	 April	 2016;	 http://www.rbc.ru/business/19/04/2016/57160a2b9a7947e59926
5f33.	Мониторинг	социально-экономического	положения	исоциального	самочувствия	
населения,	May	2016.	https://isp.hse.ru;	Россияне	сокращают	покупки	еды	уже	два	года,	
6	July	2016,	www.ng.ru
22	 In	2008,	the	budget	surplus	reached	4%	of	GDP,	while	in	2014	the	deficit	was	at	0.5%	of	GDP.	
23	 The	average	annual	oil	price	initially	assumed	in	the	budget	for	2015	(US$96/bbl)	was	ad-
justed	to	US$50,	while	the	real	average	annual	price	was	US$51.2.	By	comparison,	in	2014,	
the	real	average	price	was	US$97.6,	and	the	one	assumed	in	the	budget	was	US$93.
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oil	prices	(in	January-October	2016	they	fell	to	15.4%	of	GDP	as	compared	to	17.3%	
of	GDP	in	the	analogous	period	in	2015)24.	The	annual	budget	deficit	in	2016	was	
3.5%,	according	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	The	situation	has	been	additionally	
worsened	by	the	relatively	low	level	of	foreign	currency	reserves	at	the	Central	
Bank,	which	is	partly	a	consequence	of	unsuccessful	attempts	to	stabilise	the	
rouble	exchange	rate	at	the	end	of	2014,	as	well	as	the	dwindling	resources	of	
the	Reserve	Fund	–	the	main	source	of	financing	for	the	budget	deficit25.
Chart 4. Resources of the Reserve Fund (in 2014–beginning of 2017)
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Source: Author’s own analysis on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion (www.minfin.ru)
Russia’s economic problems thus seem to mutually fuel and exacerbate 
each other. The	causes	and	the	logic	of	this	phenomenon	are	difficult	to	explain	
without	examining	the	initial	systemic	sources	of	the	economic	crisis	in	Russia.	
These	lie	outside	the	economy.	
24	 http://www.iep.ru/files/text/crisis_monitoring/2016_19-37_December.pdf
25	 Between	November	2014	and	January	2017,	the	Reserve	Fund	fell	from	around	US$90	billion	
to	US$16	billion.	By	comparison,	Russia	entered	the	crisis	in	2008–2009	with	over	US$142	
billion	in	the	Reserve	Fund.	
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II. THE SySTEmIc cauSES oF THE EconomIc crISIS – 
THE dySFuncTIonal STaTE govErnancE modEl
Russia’s economic problems are to a great extent merely a manifestation 
of a crisis in the model of state governance. Its sources are par excellence 
political.	The	dysfunction	of	government	institutions	and	the	system	of	values	
on	which	the	system	of	managing	the	public	sphere	is	based	has	a	huge	impact	
on	the	economy	as	a	whole.	
Signs of this had become visible already in 2012, i.e. long before the present 
crisis and	soon	after	the	Russian	economy	made	up	for	the	losses	caused	by	the	
recession	in	2008–2009.	Then	GDP	growth	began	to	slow	down	even	though	oil	
prices	remained	high26.	As	investments	slowed	down	and	investors’	perception	
of	the	outlook	for	the	Russian	economy	worsened,	the	capitalisation	of	Russian	
companies	began	to	fall	from	2011	–	this	process	began	a	few	years	before	the	oil	
crisis	and	sanctions27.	The	growth	potential	of	the	economic	model	which	was	
formed	in	the	first	decade	of	the	21st	century	began	to	decline.	
This model was based on the absolute dominance of the primary sector in 
the economy, budget revenues and incomes from exports. Incomes	from	
sale	of	oil,	petroleum	products	and	natural	gas	in	pre-crisis	2013	accounted	for	
around	half	of	budget	revenue,	two-thirds	of	export	revenue,	and	17%	of	GDP28.	
The influx of petrodollars to the country (in	the	form	of	the	so-called	‘oil	
rent’,	i.e.	the	profits	owed	to	extensive	factors:	the	very	fact	of	having	and	ex-
porting	oil) ensured the constant growth of budget revenue and spending. 
The real incomes of the population were growing, too (by	even	more	than	
ten	per	cent	in	the	record-breaking	years29).	
However, the nature of the budget structure has been anti-developmen-
tal, and	has	remained	so	regardless	of	the	annual	economic	results.	Spend-
ing	on	defence	and	security	(in	aggregate,	it	reached	around	one	third	of	total	
26	 Even	though	the	average	annual	oil	price	was	at	US$110/bbl,	GDP	grew	by	3.5%	at	that	time,	
slowing	down	for	the	first	time	since	the	crisis	in	2008–2009.
27	 Н.	Акиндинова,	Я.	Кузьминов,	Е.	Ясин,	Экономика	России:	перед	долгим	переходом,	
April	2016.
28	 http://trubagaz.ru/issue-of-the-day/neft-nefteprodukty-gaz-rossijjskie-bjudzhet-i-vvp/;	
http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?PrtId=svs
29	 http://www.rbc.ru/economics/28/01/2015/54c8ed8e9a79476360df32f3
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spending	in	201330)	and	on	welfare	policy	(around	25–30%	of	total	spending,	
the	overwhelming	majority	of	this	is	made	up	by	financing	the	pension	fund)	
have	predominated.	In	turn,	healthcare	and	education	spending	did	not	exceed	
10%	of	total	spending	and	were	cut	as	part	of	the	austerity	policy	adopted	in	the	
crisis	years31.	The	important	thing	is	that	the	relatively	high	share	of	spending	
on	welfare	policy	has	not	resulted	in	a	reduction	of	the	number	of	people	below	
the	poverty	level.	In	2007–2014,	despite	the	constant	supply	of	budget	funds	
for	these	purposes,	the	share	of	population	with	incomes	below	the	minimum	
subsistence	level	remained	similar,	i.e.	11–13%32,	which	proves	that	the	govern-
ment’s	moves	in	this	area	have	been	ineffective.	
However,	what	has	had	the	most	serious	consequences	is	the	fact	that	the pe-
riod of prosperity was characterised by constantly increasing state con-
trol of the economy (the	estimated	share	the	state	has	in	the	economy	was	
35%	in	2005	and	70%	in	201533),	excessive	bureaucracy	and	the	tightening	grip	
on	the	public	sphere.	The	strengthening	redistribution	functions	of	the	state	
and	the	excessive	development	of	the	bureaucratic	apparatus	have	weakened	
civil	control	of	the	way	public	funds	are	spent,	making	citizens	and	business	
circles	dependent	on	budget	funds.	This	resulted	in	the	entrenchment	of	the	
characteristic	‘rules	of	the	game’	both	inside	the	Russian	elite	and	in	govern-
ment-business	and	government-society	relations.	The	most	effective	way	of	do-
ing	business	in	Russia	is	to	seek	support	from	groups	of	influence	linked	to	the	
government	in	the	increasingly	complex	and	aggressive	legal	and	institutional	
environment	and	in	the	context	of	a	deteriorating	business	climate.	The	lack	of	
respect	for	basic	rights	(including	property	rights)	and	the	excessive	develop-
ment	of	the	supervision	apparatus	and	the	repression	apparatus34	are	an	effect	
30	 The	share	of	defence	spending	in	Russia’s	GDP	visibly	exceeds	the	level	in	developed	coun-
tries.	See	http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=132	
31	 In	2011–2016,	federal	budget	expenditure	on	defence	increased	from	13.9%	of	total	spending	to	
19.6%,	while	spending	on	healthcare	and	education	fell	by	more	that	25%,	and	will	continue	to	fall	
until	2019.	These	expenses	have	also	been	reduced	on	the	local	level.	http://www.vedomosti.ru/
economics/articles/2016/07/14/649141-tri-goda-minfin-mozhet-naiti-12-vvp-schet-rosta-
dohodov-sokrascheniya-rashodov-schitaet-mvf#/galleries/140737492840570/normal/1;	
http://www.iep.ru/files/text/crisis_monitoring/2016_20-38_December.pdf;	http://www.ve-
domosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/10/25/662263-rossiya-latinskaya-amerika.	
32	 Помощи	нужен	контроль	и	учет,	20	April	2016,	www.kommersant.ru
33	 http://www.rzd-partner.ru/news/different/otsenka-ieffektivnosti-masshtaba-uchastiia-
gosudarstvennykh-kompanii-v--iekonomike-rf/
34	 For	more	information	see,	Maria	Domańska,	Piotr	Żochowski,	Business	under	supervision	
–	pathologies	serving	the	system	of	power	in	Russia,	OSW Commentary,	1	June	2016,	https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-06-01/business-under-supervi-
sion-pathologies-serving-system-power
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of	the	absolute dominance of the executive power and secret services in 
the institutional system of the state. According	to	government	estimates,	
the	operation	of	the	supervision	system	leads	to	business	losses	that	reach	5%	
of	GDP	annually35.	Small	and	medium-sized	business,	which	have	no	links	to	
political	decision-makers,	are	the	main	victim	of	suppressing	competition	and	
the	lawlessness	of	the	increasingly	strong	secret	services.	
Furthermore, all levels and areas of the Russian state’s operation –	from	big	
contracts	as	part	of	public	procurement	to	education,	healthcare	and	citizen’s	
everyday	contacts	with	public	servants	–	are permeated by the omnipresent 
systemic corruption which	is	an	effect	of	the	historic	legacy	and	the	fact	that	
a	great	volume	of	‘easy	money’	was	until	recently	in	circulation.	The	estimated	
losses	to	the	state	budget	and	business	circles	inflicted	by	corruption	reach	hun-
dreds	of	billions	of	dollars	annually	(estimates	have	been	made,	for	example,	
by	Transparency	International)36.	Russia	has	for	years	been	far	below	the	top	
one	hundred	countries	covered	by	the	survey	in	Transparency	International’s	
corruption	perception	rankings37.
The	activity	of	non-transparent	lobbyists	and	the	intensifying	phenomenon	
of	clientelism	are	manifested,	for	example,	through	lobbying	the	increasing	
financing	of	inefficient	state-owned	companies	by	particular	groups	inside	the	
elite.	This	is	often	done	under	the	pretext	that	the	companies	will	be	modern-
ised	or	will	implement	extensive	development	strategies	and	expensive	infra-
structural	projects38.	Public	procurement	is	usually	used	to	misappropriate 
public funds by the oligarch lobby or people directly linked to Vladimir 
Putin.	While	profits	generated	by	such	transactions	are	privatised,	losses	are	
nationalised	(i.e.	incurred	by	the	state	budget).	As	Tatyana	Golikova,	the	Head	
35	 Dmitry	Medvedev’s	statement,	http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/58076f7a9a7947e97fdee1a2	
36	 http://vz.ru/economy/2009/11/17/349632.html,	17	November	2009;	http://pasmi.ru/archi-
ve/127691,	25	August	2015
37	 According	to	Transparency	International’s	report	for	2016,	Russia	was	ranked	131st	of	176	
states;	http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table	(by	comparison	Poland	was	in	
29th	place	in	this	rating).
38	 The	flagship	examples	of	unreasonable	building	of	fortunes	on	infrastructural	projects	in-
clude:	holding	the	APEC	summit	in	2012	and	the	Olympic	Games	in	Sochi	in	2014	(the	costs	
might	have	been	overstated	by	more	than	ten	billion	roubles	and	US$30	billion,	respectively);	
https://rg.ru/2012/11/12/stepashin.html;	 http://echo.msk.ru/blog/nemtsov_boris/1009664-
echo/.	Well-known	examples	of	wasting	public	funds	also	include	the	operation	of	the	Rus-
sian	Railways	which	until	2015	was	managed	by	Vladimir	Yakunin	(a	member	of	Vladimir	
Putin’s	 ‘inner	 circle’)	 and	 the	 activity	 of	Vnesheconombank	 (the	 bank’s	financial	 gap	may	
reach	as	much	as	1.5	trillion	roubles).	
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of	the	Accounts	Chamber	of	the	Russian	Federation,	stated	in	April	2016,	the	
financial	losses	caused	by	corruption	and	mismanagement	each	year	are	several	
times	higher	than	the	losses	resulting	from	falling	oil	prices,	reaching	trillions	
of	roubles39.	A	great	deal	of	the	stolen	funds	have	most	likely	been	transferred	
to	tax	havens	–	according	to	some	surveys,	over	one	trillion	dollars	may	have	
been	siphoned	off	from	Russia	between	the	early	1990s	and	the	end	of	201440.	
This	was	done	not	only	in	order	to	evade	taxes	but	also	out	of	a	desire	to	protect	
assets	from	Russian	jurisdiction.	
Two conditions needed to be met for the model formed this way to function 
smoothly: high oil prices and their constant growth. As	long	as	the	prices	
were	growing,	the	government	managed	to	achieve	the	main	goal	of	the	eco-
nomic	policy,	namely	the	constant	enrichment	of	the	elite	alongside	relatively	
low	social	costs.	The	system’s	inefficiency	was	masked	through	constant	injec-
tions	of	‘easy	money’	from	the	raw	material	rent	addressed	to	the	real	sector	and	
social	transfers.	This	allowed	the	Russian	elite	to	avoid	the	need	of	reforming	
the	state	and	the	economy	and,	regardless	of	this,	to	maintain	production	and	
employment	levels,	as	a	result	of	which	all	social	groups	benefited	from	the	oil	
prosperity,	though	to	different	extents.	
This mechanism began to malfunction when oil prices stopped growing in 
2012. It failed completely after they fell, starting from 2014. The systemic 
problems became evident with double strength in the new reality, above	
all	the	elite’s	kleptocratic	attitude	to	the	state	and	society,	as	well	as	the	fragil-
ity	of	the	foundations	of	economic	growth	based	on	an	unstable	boom	on	the	
raw	material	market.	The state governance model in place so far involved	
structural	problems	being	masked	through	a	constant	increase	in	ineffective	
budget	spending.	In	this	model	economic	calculation	was	becoming	increasingly	
irrational.	This	resulted in the exhaustion of internal sources of long-term 
growth. The	falling	oil	prices	entail	a	reduction	of	revenues	from	exports,	but	
an	adequate	cut	of	import	costs	is	impossible,	given	the	fact	that	the	economy	
is	highly	dependent	on	imported	goods	and	technologies41.	Domestic	demand	
is	falling	as	a	result	of	the	dwindling	real	incomes	of	Russian	residents.	The	
level	of	investments	is	also	falling,	above	all	due	to	the	poor	investment	climate	
39	 http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-04-19/1_golikova.html
40	 http://www.rbc.ru/economics/09/05/2016/572fc4839a79479bd682e3eb
41	 One	proof	of	 this	dependence	 is	Russia’s	 foreign	 trade	dynamics	 in	 January	–	November	
2016.	Within	this	timeframe	exports	fell	by	19.2%	and	imports	by	1.4%	year-on-year;	www.
gks.ru	
19
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
17
and	distrust	of	the	government’s	policy.	All	this	means	that	higher	government	
spending	is	the	only	possible	source	of	stimulating	economic	development	(and	
that	only	in	the	short	run,	anyway),	which	is	unreal,	given	the	increasing	budget	
gap	and	the	dwindling	reserves.	
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III. THE anTI-crISIS SHow – THE KrEmlIn’S 
HElplESSnESS In THE FacE oF EconomIc cHallEngES
The Russian government elite has sufficient knowledge of the condition of 
the economy and understands the key problems. This	is	proven,	for	example,	
by	the	analyses	and	forecasts	published	regularly	by	the	Central	Bank,	as	well	as	
diagnoses	from	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	Ready-to-use formulas are also pre-
sent –	reform	strategies	have	been	developed	several	times	(including	the	‘Gref	
programme’	of	2000	or	the	‘Strategy	2020’	developed	in	2011),	as	are	free	funds,	
if	one	takes	into	account	the	scale	of	public	money	being	wasted.	According	to	
the	Russian	Accounts	Chamber,	Russia’s	problem	is	not	so	much	the	deficiency	
of	funds	but	rather	the	lack	of	efficient	fund	management	institutions42.	
The government is clearly lacking the political will to change the govern-
ance model and	to	support	those	who	want	reforms	with	real	competences.	
One	proof	of	this	is	the	fact	that	none	of	the	development	strategies	developed	
so	far	has	been	implemented	to	a	significant	degree.	This	is	caused	by	financial	
motives	(the elite is not ready to share its future income with the public), 
the political background, and the psychology of power. The	durable	connec-
tion	of	power	and	ownership	in	Russia,	the	mutual	distrust	inside	the	elite	and	
the	awareness	that	their	political	influence	will	be	at	stake	should	the	costly	
and	socially	painful	reforms	be	implemented,	effectively	thwart	any	attempts	
to	actually	put	them	into	effect.	The	key	institutions	that	would	have	to	be	re-
formed	are	the	foundation	of	the	present	government	system	which	guarantees	
incomes	and	security	to	the	elite.	Thus the ‘reform paradox’ is that the logic 
of the government’s response to the crisis is strongly conditioned by the 
logic of the existing ineffective and anti-reform oriented model focused on 
maintaining stability and control of socio-political life. 
As a result, the government’s anti-crisis tactic is concentrated on several 
basic directions of action which are intended to replace or mitigate the 
lack of real recovery plans. Those	that	need	to	be	singled	out	among	them	
are	temporary	measures	(mainly	economic)	and	extensive	long-term	actions,	
mainly	in	the	area	of	politics	and	propaganda.	
Temporary measures include above all support from the federal budget to 
selected sectors of the economy and regional budgets, as well as preventing 
42	 Tatyana	Golikova’s	statement	at	the	International	Economic	Forum	in	Saint	Petersburg	in	
June	2016.
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social tension in the regions. The	overriding	goal	of	these	is	to	maintain	a	sta-
ble	social	situation	in	the	country	in	the	period	preceding	the	presidential	elec-
tion	(scheduled	for	2018).	Part	of	the	problems	which	the	government	is	trying	
to	overcome	by	using	funds	from	the	public	budget	is	a	direct	effect	of	the	con-
sequences	of	the	erroneous	decisions	revealed	by	the	crisis	and	many	years	of	
neglect	from	the	government	itself.	
The especially bad situation in some sectors (banks,	construction,	and	the	
car	industry)	induced the government to launch a comprehensive financial 
aid programme in 2015. There	are	visible	signs	of	stabilisation	in	the	bank-
ing	sector	mainly	owing	to	strong	government	support—aid	provided	in	2015	
(a	total	of	at	least	2.3%	of	GDP43)	helped	stabilise	the	financial	market	and	the	
rouble	exchange	rate	and	also	made	it	easier	for	banks	to	implement	adapta-
tion	strategies.	As	a	result,	the	sector’s	profits	were	consistently	growing	in	
2016	(formally	reaching	930	billion	roubles,	i.e.	almost	five	times	more	than	in	
2015)	even	though	this	sector	still	has	serious	structural	problems44.	Support	
for	selected	industries	from	the	real	sector	made	it	possible	to	reduce	the	scale	
of	losses	(including	in	the	car	and	construction	industries45)	and	to	prevent	
mass	redundancies.	The	investments	in	the	defence	industry	also	had	a	positive	
effect.	Its	13%	growth	in	201546	stimulated	the	branches	linked	with	military	
production,	which	improves	the	situation	in	industry	in	general,	at	the	same	
time	maintains	the	level	of	employment.	
Aid offered to regional budgets is also important. It	is	worth	noting	that	their	
financial	problems	were	previously	generated	artificially,	already	in	2013.	Then,	
as	a	consequence	of	the	populist	decrees	passed	by	Vladimir	Putin	in	May	2012	
43	 For	more	information	on	the	strategy	and	scale	of	the	government’s	support	for	banks	see,	
Maria	 Domańska,	 Rosyjski	 sektor	 bankowy.	 Rok	w	 kryzysie,	OSW Commentary,	 29	March	
2016,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2016-03-29/rosyjski-sektor-
bankowy-rok-w-kryzysie
44	 http://cbr.ru/analytics/bank_system/din_razv_16_12.htm.	 The	 sector’s	 real	 profits	 are	
many	times	lower	if	one	takes	into	account	the	scale	of	growth	of	the	compulsory	reserves	
which	consume	a	huge	part	of	the	profits,	as	well	as	‘creative	accounting’	(banks	hiding	their	
financial	problems)	and	unreliable	audits	applied	on	a	massive	scale	–	 the	problems	this	
sector	has	been	facing	since	the	crisis	 in	2008–2009;	Половина	банковских	аудиторов	
заверяли	недостоверную	отчетность	–	ЦБ,	26	July	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru
45	 Total	assistance	for	the	car	industry	in	2015–2016	may	have	reached	180	billion	roubles;	htt-
ps://mfd.ru/news/view/?id=2117495;	 https://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2015/12/02_a_7930847.
shtml.	In	turn,	the	governmental	programme	for	subsidising	mortgage	loans	is	a	great	sup-
port	for	the	construction	sector.	
46	 Estimates	from	the	deputy	prime	minister	Dmitry	Rogozin,	http://www.bbc.com/russian/
news/2016/05/160530_rogozin_military
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and	despite	the	already	visible	slowdown	of	economic	growth,	the	regions	had	
to	shoulder	the	burden	of	wage	raises	in	the	public	sector	without	any	additional	
transfers	from	the	federal	budget	(they	had	to	incur	70%	of	the	expenses47).	To	
finance	these	liabilities,	they	took	out	expensive	bank	loans.	As	a	result,	both	
the	regional	debt	(in	many	regions	it	exceeded	the	legally	admissible	level48)	and	
the	regional	budget	deficit49	were	growing	at	a	fast	rate.	The	debt	service	costs	
became	a	real	problem	when	recession	came,	as	on	the	one	hand	the	possibilities	
of	financial	assistance	from	the	federal	budget	reduced,	and	on	the	other	tax	
revenues	accounting	for	two	thirds	of	regions’	own	incomes	began	to	contract.	
Regional	authorities	attempt	to	reduce	budget	deficits	mainly	by	cutting	so-
cial	spending	(education,	healthcare	and	welfare	care).	Their	austerity	policies	
have	been	aided	by	measures	taken	by	the	federal	centre,	such	as	replacing	the	
expensive	commercial	loans	with	government	loans	with	a	symbolic	interest	
rate50.	160	billion	roubles	were	allocated	on	loan	support	for	the	regions	in	2015.	
This	amount	was	nearly	doubled	in	2016.	As	a	result,	total	deficit	of	the	regions	
was	reduced	almost	fourfold	in	2015	when	compared	to	2013,	but	most	federal	
subjects	(over	70)	had	problems	with	a	budget	deficit	in	those	years51.	The	finan-
cial	situation	of	the	regional	budgets	is	exacerbated	by	the	local	social	situation	
and	the	situation	of	companies,	and	this	poses	the	risk	that	the	regions’	own	
incomes	will	continue	to	fall.	The	regional	governments	can	also	seek	additional	
assistance	from	Moscow;	this,	though,	often	depends	on	their	lobbying	skills	
rather	than	on	automatically	functioning	support	mechanisms.
The government has also taken measures to better recognise the potential 
causes and areas of public protests. It	appears	that	this	is	precisely	the	goal	
of	the	surveys	commissioned	by	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development	which	
47	 Н.	Зубаревич,	Регионы	России	и	экономический	кризис,	http://poistine.org/regiony-
rossii-i-ekonomicheskiy-krizis#.V5fCRbiLS71
48	 The	debt	of	the	record-breaking	region	exceeded	180%	of	its	own	income	in	2015.	https://
www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/07/15/649305-regioni-mogut-poluchit-dost-
up-kreditam-plavayuschei-protsentnoi-stavkoi
49	 In	2013,	the	regions’	total	deficit	tripled;	77	regions	had	budget	gaps	(57	in	2011).	Минфин	
хочет	сократить	трансферты	регионам	на	15,5%,	25	July	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru
50	 http://tass.ru/ekonomika/3434632	
51	 Even	though	the	share	of	loans	granted	from	the	state	budget	have	clearly	increased	in	the	
case	of	regional	debts	(such	loans	currently	predominate	in	the	regions’	debt	structure,	ac-
counting	for	over	48%),	this	form	of	assistance	will	most	likely	be	insufficient.	https://www.
vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/07/15/649305-regioni-mogut-poluchit-dostup-
kreditam-plavayuschei-protsentnoi-stavkoi;	http://iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/monreo/mon-
reo-2016-36-772.pdf	
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are	conducted	to	identify	the	potential	threats	to	Russia’s	socio-economic	se-
curity52.	The	secret	services	are	also	certainly	probing	public	sentiment.	How-
ever,	it	should	be	suspected	that	the	government’s	main	objective	is	not	really	
to	improve	the	situation	in	the	‘trouble	spots’	but	rather	to	take	preventive	and	
repressive	measures	to	stamp	out	the	protest	potential	before	it	happens.	The	
characteristic	manner	of	managing	the	Russian	labour	market	(including	pres-
sure	to	avoid	large-scale	redundancies	by	large	employers	that	might	generate	
social	tension)	is	intended	to	serve	similar	purposes53.	At	the	same	time,	a	great	
deal	of	responsibility	for	the	socio-political	situation	in	the	regions	is	placed	on	
the	regional	governments.	These	are	forced	to	cautiously	manoeuvre	between	
presenting	the	situation	in	their	area	as	stable	(to	prove	their	effectiveness	and	
usefulness	for	the	system)	and	posing	the	threat	of	destabilisation	in	the	case	of	
a	lack	of	additional	budget	transfers	from	the	centre.	There	is	also	an	increas-
ingly	strong	tendency	to	require	local	business	circles	to	co-finance	regional	
expenses	(one	proof	of	this	are	the	problems	Renova,	Viktor	Vekselberg’s	firm,	
is	facing	due	to	being	forced	to	sponsor	the	electricity	supplies	to	residents	of	
the	Komi	Republic)	54.
Another characteristic feature of Russian crisis management is seen in 
the attempts at ‘manual control’—the selective	extinguishing	of	existing	
and	potential	problems	not	through	automatically	functioning	institutional	
mechanisms	but	by	means	of	direct	interventions	by	the	most	senior	officials,	
frequently	by	the	president	himself.	These	interventions	sometimes	cause	a	real	
improvement	of	the	situations,	but	sometimes	seem	to	be	merely	a	carefully	
stage-managed	show55.
Special attention needs to be paid to conscious, cynical moves from the 
government whose priorities include maintaining the loyalty of selected 
52	 http://www.rbc.ru/economics/31/05/2016/574d9a319a7947224fa1789f
53	 The	mining	and	metallurgical	company	Mechel,	which	employs	around	66,000	people,	is	
an	interesting	example.	Banks	withdrew	from	launching	a	bankruptcy	procedure	against	
this	company	that	would	have	caused	mass	redundancies	most	likely	as	a	result	of	an	in-
tervention	by	the	Kremlin	(this	move	was	also	intended	at	sparing	financial	problems	to	
the	company’s	main	creditor,	Gazprombank,	which	is	cherished	by	the	Kremlin).	Reuters	
рассказал	о	роли	Кремля	в	спасении	«Мечела»,	14 July	2016,	www.rbc.ru
54	 For	details	see	http://www.rbc.ru/business/05/09/2016/57cd91eb9a7947111e43a27b
55	 Vladimir	Putin’s	annual	teleconference	(‘hotline	with	the	president’)	is	a	textbook	example	
of	the	ostentatiously	demonstrated	single-person	rule	of	the	country,	for	instance	the	one	
held	in	April	2016,	when	the	president	received	complaints,	for	example,	about	the	terrible	
condition	of	roads	 in	the	regions	or	a	violation	of	employees’	rights	at	 the	fish	factory	 in	
Sakhalin	(in	effect,	administrative	measures	were	taken	in	both	of	these	cases).	
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members of the elite by ensuring financial benefits for them –	at	the	ex-
pense	of	the	state	budget	and	people’s	living	standards.	The	lucrative	contracts	
offered	to	the	Rotenberg	family	–	who	are	close	friends	of	Putin	included	in	
the	Western	sanctions	list	–	are	one	example	of	this56.	Regardless	of	the	scale	
of	corruption	and	the	very	small	reductions	in	spending	on	security	and	de-
fence	made	so	far57,	the	budget	cuts	have	affected	social	expenses	in	the	first	
order.	This	includes	freezing	transfers	from	the	state	budget	to	pension	funds	
as	part	of	the	open	investment	fund	system,	and	manipulations	concerning	
the	indexation	of	pension	benefits58.	Cuts	have	also	been	made	in	healthcare	
spending.	The	implementation	of	the	flagship	programme	of	import	substitu-
tion	has	also	turned	out	to	be	harmful	to	the	public.	This	is	presented	as	a	recipe	
for	independent	long-term	development59	when	in	fact	it	has	been	temporar-
ily	used	by	local	manufacturers,	including	members	of	the	government	elite,	
as	another	channel	for	fraudulently	obtaining	subsidies	or	public	orders.	The	
essence	of	this	policy	is	manifested	by	the	strictly	politically	motivated	deci-
sion	of	the	Kremlin	to	impose	an	embargo	on	imports	of	food	from	the	West	
in	August	2014	and	then	from	Turkey	(in	November	2015)60.	This	not	only	in-
creased	import	costs	as	a	result	of	importing	food	from	more	distant	regions,	
it	also	encouraged	local	food	producers	to	significantly	raise	food	prices,	while	
56	 In	2015	Arkady	Rotenberg’s	firm,	Stroygazmontazh,	entered	into	contracts	covering	the	im-
plementation	of	governmental	projects	(including	the	construction	of	the	Crimean	bridge	
and	the	Power	of	Siberia	gas	pipeline)	worth	in	total	over	0.5	trillion	roubles.	Public	pro-
curement	procedures	were	not	conducted	in	most	of	the	cases.	One	case	which	caused	par-
ticularly	strong	public	outrage	(in	the	form	of	driver	strikes	across	Russia)	was	the	contract	
signed	in	2015	with	Igor	Rotenberg’s	firm	covering	the	operation	of	the	newly	introduced	
controversial	system	of	charging	trucks	for	moving	along	domestic	roads.	For	details	see:	
http://www.forbes.ru/rating-photogallery/313039-koroli-goszakaza-2016-reiting-forbes;	
https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/07/05/647963-vladeltsi-gruzovikov-
smogut-ignorirovat-transportnii-nalog-esli-plata-platon-okazhetsya-bolshe
57	 See	 for	 example,	 https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/09/09/656321-min-
fin-voennie-rashodi	In	the	amended	budget	for	2016,	defence	expenses	even	increased,	thus	
widening	the	budget	gap.	See,	Maria	Domańska,	Iwona	Wiśniewska,	Government	expendi-
ture	in	Russia	increases	despite	the	crisis,	OSW Analyses,	12	October	2016,	https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-10-12/government-expenditure-russia-increases-
despite-crisis
58	 It	was	decided,	 for	example,	 to	 replace	 the	 indexation	of	pensions	 for	2016	with	a	 single	
payment	of	5,000	roubles	(less	than	US$80)	at	the	beginning	of	2017	which,	by	 lowering	
the	base	for	indexation	in	the	next	three	years	is	expected	to	bring	as	much	as	850	billion	
roubles	of	budget	savings.	http://www.rbc.ru/economics/09/09/2016/57d2b2d09a794727d6
612c9d
59	 See	Sergey	Glazyev’s	lecture:	Как	обогнать	Запад,	не	догоняя	его,	http://www.business-
gazeta.ru/article/144949
60	 This	was	a	response	 to	Western	economic	sanctions	 imposed	on	Russia	and	the	shooting	
down	of	the	Russian	military	aircraft	by	Turkey	over	the	Syrian	border	in	November	2015.	
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its	quality	was	falling61.	The	family	of	the	minister	for	agriculture,	Alexander	
Tkachov	(who	has	a	say	on	the	future	of	the	embargo)	is	among	those	who	have	
benefited	from	the	import	substitution	programme.	They	are	able	to	benefit	
owing	to	the	network	of	firms	operating	in	the	food	and	agriculture	sector62.	
Similarly,	attempts	to	replace	foreign	medicines	with	products	of	the	Russian	
pharmaceutical	industry	ended	up	in	shortages	and	an	increase	in	prices63.
These moves by the government are masked through a kind of twisting re-
ality, something the	former	economy	minister,	Alexey	Ulyukaev,	was	particu-
larly	good	at.	Since	the	beginning	of	2015	the	public	has	been	regularly	persuaded	
that	Russia	had	already	overcome	or	is	overcoming	the	crisis	and	that	economic	
growth	should	be	expected	soon64.	It	is	often	concealed	that	the	small	economic	
growth	expected	in	2017	will	not	signify	real	development.	These	moves	are	ac-
companied	by	aggressive anti-Western propaganda	aimed	at	convincing	the	
audience	that	the	causes	of	the	crisis	are	mainly	external.	In	addition	to	the	falling	
oil	prices	which	are	dependent	on	the	market	situation,	the	government	claims	
that	these	external	causes	include	‘undeserved’	and	‘groundless’	sanctions	im-
posed	on	Russia	aimed	at	‘bringing	it	to	its	knees’.	The	overriding	goal	of	anti-
Western	propaganda	is	to	mobilise	public	support	for	the	government	despite	the	
financial	problems	and	deteriorating	living	conditions	which	are	increasingly	
being	felt	by	Russian	people.	Stoking	the	atmosphere	of	threat,	even	of	a	military	
nature	(including	the	bitter	criticism	of	‘NATO’s	Eastward	expansion’)	is	intended	
to	cause	that—in	the	face	of	an	alleged	threat	to	survival	of	the	Russian	state	and	
nation,	any	internal	differences	will	melt	away	and	any	possible	resentments	
which	citizens	have	against	the	government	will	become	pointless.	
Along with the temporary moves intended at neutralising selected mani-
festations of the crisis by way of adequately applied propaganda, the gov-
ernment has also taken long-term action aimed	above	all	at	maintaining	high	
public	support	levels	for	Vladimir	Putin	ahead	of	the	presidential	election.	These	
actions	are	based	on	simulating	the	creation	of	a	state	development	strategy,	
61	 One	example	of	 the	negative	consequences	of	 the	substitution	 is	 the	 large-scale	addition	
of	harmful	palm	oil	to	dairy	products.	Russian	imports	of	palm	oil	have	been	consistently	
growing	since	2015.	Сыроделы	паразитируют	на	продуктовом	эмбарго,	20	June	2016,	
www.ng.ru;	http://www.ng.ru/economics/2016-01-19/1_milk.html
62	 http://www.zagolovki.ru/daytheme/tkachev/21Apr2016;	http://www.rbc.ru/business/11/1
1/2015/564329409a79473a0d551b24
63	 https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2066491.html
64	 This	thesis	has	also	been	put	forward	in	public	on	several	occasions	by	Vladimir	Putin	(in-
cluding	during	the	International	Economic	Forum	in	Saint	Petersburg	in	June	2016).
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the	manifestation	of	which	is	the	discussion	on	the	desired	direction	of	reforms	
seen	among	the	government	elite.	It	is	intended	at	concealing	the	lack	of	a	real	
anti-crisis	strategy,	above	all	to	delude	the	public,	including	liberal	circles,	and	
also	foreign	investors.	
In	this	context	the	simultaneous	activation	of	several	advisory	and	decision-
making	centres	is	symptomatic.	According	to	the	government’s	declarations,	
these	are	expected	to	work	on	reforms65.	Not	only	various	ideas	to	overcome	the	
crisis	have	been	put	forward	so	far,	but	also	assurances	of	the	desire	to	combat	
corruption,	improve	the	business	climate,	and	improve	the	competitiveness	of	
the	Russian	economy	can	be	regularly	heard	in	such	debates.	These	are	nothing	
but	propaganda	slogans,	if	one	takes	into	account	the	real	sources	of	Russia’s	
economic	problems.	
There is a clear difference of opinion in these discussions66: the need to 
choose between boosting development by increasing budget expenditure 
and an austerity policy combined with a tough monetary and loan policy. 
This	results	both	from	an	attachment	to	the	various	economic	theories	and	the	
lobbying	of	certain	business	groups	interested	in	the	choice	of	anti-crisis	instru-
ments	that	would	be	beneficial	to	them.	
The	project	of	softening	the	monetary	and	budget	policy	for	the	sake	of	stim-
ulating	production	and	investments	using	public	funds	has	been	pushed	for	
mainly	by	the	presidential	advisor	Sergey	Glazyev,	and	Boris	Titov,	the	business	
ombudsman	and	the	head	of	the	Party	of	Growth	established	in	2016	with	the	
Kremlin’s	support.	The	project	envisages	the	activation	of	banks	and	govern-
mental	development	institutions67	by	the	state	and	controlled	issues	of	money	
65	 In	April	2016,	President	Putin	made	 the	 former	minister	of	finance,	Alexei	Kudrin,	part	
of	the	management	team	of	the	Centre	for	Strategic	Research	and	entrusted	him	with	the	
preparation	of	a	development	plan	for	the	coming	years.	The	presidential	Economic	Council	
has	also	resumed	work	after	a	two-year	break,	with	the	participation	of	representatives	of	
the	government,	other	decision-making	centres	and	experts.	At	the	same	time,	the	govern-
ment	 is	working	on	a	development	strategy	for	Russia	until	2030	as	part	of	 its	statutory	
strategic	planning	obligation.	Two	other	organisations	have	also	been	established:	a	com-
mission	for	reform	of	the	state	administration	chaired	by	the	president,	and	a	council	for	
strategic	development	tasked	with	developing	key	projects	aimed	at	introducing	structural	
changes	in	the	economy	and	the	social	sphere.	
66	 For	more	 information	on	proposals	put	 forward	during	 the	discussion	 see,	Путину	посо-
ветовали,	как	вернуть	экономику	к	росту,	26	May	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru
67	 There	 is	 an	excessive	number	of	developmental	 institutions	 in	Russia	 (around	30).	Even	
though	 their	 operation	 is	 ineffective	 (the	 country	 is	 not	 developing),	 the	 government	 is	
building	this	apparatus	further.	In	May	2016,	Dmitry	Medvedev	signed	a	decree	establish-
27
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
2/
20
17
(around	1.5	trillion	roubles,	i.e.	around	US$25	billion	annually)68	to	credit	the	
real	sector	and	investments	in	infrastructure.	
The reindustrialisation proposal from the defence industry’s lobby is an 
attempt to make the ideas for stimulating economic growth more specific. 
Officially,	this	is	intended	to	ensure	a	technological	leap	to	Russia	that	will	com-
pensate	for	its	backwardness	when	compared	to	other	countries69.	The	proposals	
for	a	‘new	industrialisation’	as	a	rule	are	limited	to	a	general	characterising	of	
Russian	industry’s	technological	and	modernisation	needs,	without	seriously	
addressing	the	key	challenges	and	systemic	problems	which	adversely	affect	
the	economic	sphere	in	general.	A	successful	reindustrialisation	would	require	
a	reversal	of	the	trend	that	was	formed	over	the	past	few	years–in	2013,	before	
the	crisis,	the	share	of	high-tech	production	in	Russian	exports	of	industrial	
goods	was	at	23%	(for	example,	in	China	it	was	60%),	and	this	share	was	reduced	
in	the	preceding	decade,	which	was	contrary	to	the	trends	seen	in	the	other	
BRICS	countries70.
One	of	the	most	frequent	reindustrialisation	proposals	is	the	idea	of	develop-
ing	(with	the	help	of	state	investment)	the	defence	industry	(with	around	a	15%	
share	in	industrial	production71)	as	development	leverage	for	the	whole	econ-
omy.	This	is	in	fact	a	reference	to	the	logic	of	the	militarised	Soviet	industry.	
This	idea	may	seem	appealing,	considering	the	growth	tempo	of	the	military	
industry	sector	(estimated	to	have	reached	13%	in	2015).	However,	the	develop-
ment	of	isolated	modernisation	centres	(there	is	no	exchange	of	innovation	be-
tween	the	defence	industry	and	the	civilian	sectors	in	Russia)	in	the	conditions	
of	a	modern	economy	is	unrealistic.	This	would	also	most	likely	mean	a	fur-
ther	reduction	of	spending	on	other	goals,	including	investments	in	education,	
which	are	essential	for	authentic	modernisation,	and	a	further	weakening	of	
the	private	sector,	including	small	and	medium-sized	companies.	This	strategy	
ing	an	Agency	for	Technological	Development	 tasked	with	“modernisation,	 the	substitu-
tion	of	imports,	and	improving	the	competitiveness	of	Russian	firms”.	Куда	дает	деньги	
наблюдательный	совет	ВЭБа,	обществу	знать	не	положено;	materials	from	the	govern-
ment’s	meeting	on	26	May	2016,	http://government.ru/news/23181/
68	 Путину	на	экономическом	совете	предложили	запустиь	«печатный	станок»,	25	May	
2016,	www.rbc.ru
69	 Доклад	Сергея	Глазьева:	«Как	обогнать	Запад,	не	догоняя	его»,	http://www.business-
gazeta.ru/article/144949
70	 UNIDO	data,	https://iq.hse.ru/news/177669045.html
71	 С.	Алексашенко,	Дно	(если	не	пройдено,	то)	обязательно	будет	пройдено!,	28	June	2016,	
https://openrussia.org/post/view/16032/
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would	only	aggravate	the	backwardness	of	the	Russian	economy	as	a	whole.	
It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	it	is	being	pushed	through	for	social	reasons	and	
is	intended	to	serve	the	basic	needs	of	maintaining	social	stability	during	the	
crisis.	Employees	of	the	defence	industry	and	related	branches	–	the	defence	
industry	also	partly	works	for	civilian	needs	–	and	their	families	form	a	group	
of	around	15	million	people72.
The	proposals	to	stimulate	development	by	increasing	spending	also	include	
the	idea	of	boosting	consumer	demand	through	raising	people’s	real	incomes.	
The	deputy	prime	minister	for	social	affairs,	Olga	Golodets,	has	been	calling	for	
this73.	This	is	in	fact	a	repetition	of	the	solution	that	was	successfully	applied	
in	2008–2009,	and	thus	in	different	macroeconomic	conditions.	Golodets	also	
opposes	the	project	put	forward	by	the	Ministry	for	the	Economy	envisaging	
a	reduction	of	business	costs	by	cutting	labour	costs74.
These	ideas	are	unanimously	opposed	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	which	takes	
care	of	the	budget	deficit	level,	and	Putin’s	advisor,	Alexei	Kudrin.	This	brings	
them	close	to	the	stance	adopted	by	the	Central	Bank	(one	of	its	goals	is	to	reduce	
inflation	to	4%	in	2017,	which	requires	strict	control	of	the	money	in	circula-
tion).	Representatives	of	the	Central	Bank	and	Kudrin	openly	say	that	thor-
ough	system	reforms	are	necessary,	including,	as	Kudrin	pointed	out:	limit-
ing	the	state’s	participation	in	the	economy,	a	reform	of	the	judiciary	and	law	
enforcement	agencies,	and	limiting	spending	on	ineffective	state-controlled	
companies75.	The	Central	Bank	has	warned	on	several	occasions	of	‘permanent	
stagnation’	as	a	consequence	of	the	lack	of	structural	reforms;	without	these	the	
Russian	economy	will	grow	at	a	maximum	rate	of	2%	annually	(i.e.	below	the	
forecasted	global	average)76.	According	to	Kudrin,	institutional	reforms	would	
offer	a	chance	to	make	economic	growth	based	not	on	state	investments	but	on	
72	 The	sector	which	produces	goods	for	the	needs	of	the	army	alone	employs,	according	to	in-
formation	from	the	Ministry	of	Defence,	over	two	million	people.	Россия	уходит	в	оборону,	
26	January	2015,	http://svpressa.ru/economy/article/110934/
73	 Заглянуть	за	горизонт:	что	предложили	Путину	на	экономическом	совете,	25	May	2016,	
http://www.rbc.ru/economics/25/05/2016/5745c18c9a794703df6b5a6a;	Голодец	призвала	
сделать	ставку	на	потребление,	17	June	2016,	www.rbc.ru
74	 https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/06/09/644720-chto-delat;	Заглянуть	за	
горизонт,	op. cit.
75	 Заглянуть	за	горизонт,	op. cit.
76	 For	Elvira	Nabiullina’s	opinion	see,	for	example,	Экономический	совет	при	президенте	
должен	найти	рецепт	роста	ВВП	на	4%,	9	May	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru;	Важно	было	
вовремя	перекрыть	кран,	29	June	2016,	www.vedomosti.ru
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private	investments	(in	his	opinion,	companies	have	accumulated	as	much	as	
12	trillion	roubles	of	available	funds	on	bank	deposits77).	
Kudrin’s proposals appear to be the most well-thought-out and consistent 
of the solutions presented so far, but they will be impossible to implement 
for political reasons because they would undermine the foundations of 
the existing model where the state is governed by a small group forming 
the elite. Furthermore,	there	is	a	tacit	consensus	among	the	participants	of	
the	reform	debate	that	the	proposals	of	strictly	political	reforms	(free	elections	
and	respect	for	civil	liberties	and	rights)	remain	a	taboo.	In	this	context,	Putin’s	
reaction	to	Kudrin’s	proposal	of	reducing	tension	in	the	policy	towards	the	West	
for	the	sake	of	economic	development	was	symptomatic.	The	president,	justify-
ing	the	present	anti-Western	policy,	employed	such	categories	as	‘sovereignty’	
and	‘Russia’s	thousand-year-old	history’.	This	leaves	no	doubt	about	the	real	
priorities	of	the	government	as	regards	governing	the	country78.
One proof that the reform debates have a purely ritual nature is the way 
the transactions of sale of part of the shares in two oil companies (Bashneft	
and	Rosneft)	were effected	in	the	last	months	of	2016.	This	officially	generated	
a	revenue	of	around	one	trillion	roubles	(around	US$16.5	billion)	to	the	state	
budget.	The	Russian	government	has	called	these	transactions	privatisation,	
while	in	fact	Bashneft	was	taken	over	by	the	state-controlled	company	Rosneft,	
and	a	19.5%	stake	in	Rosneft	was	sold	in	a	very	non-transparent	way79.	In	the	
latter	case,	most	likely	Russian	state-owned	banks	supported	by	the	Central	
Bank	of	Russia	were	engaged	in	financing	the	transaction;	furthermore,	it	is	
unclear	who	the	new	real	owner	of	the	stake	is.	Officially,	the	main	goal	of	these	
transactions	was	to	generate	budget	revenues,	but	how	much	the	state	budget	
actually	gained	is	difficult	to	assess	(as	a	consequence,	Rosneft’s	incomes	have	
been	reduced,	for	example,	and	it	will	thus	pay	less	in	tax	and	dividends	to	its	
majority	shareholder,	i.e.	the	state).
77	 http://www.1tv.ru/news/2016/05/29/303095-diagnoz_rossiyskoy_ekonomike_stavyat_
spetsialisty_na_zasedanii_prezidiuma_ekonomicheskogo_soveta_obsudili_vozmozhnye_st-
senarii_vyhoda_iz_krizisa.	Potential	investors	are,	however,	discouraged	by	the	uncertainty	
surrounding	 the	 further	development	of	 the	 economic	 situation	and	 the	directions	of	 the	
government’s	economic	policy,	as	well	as	the	serious	drop	in	domestic	demand	as	a	result	of	
the	falling	incomes	of	the	Russian	public.
78	 https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/05/31/kudrinwest/;	http://politcom.ru/21170.html
79	 For	transaction	details	see,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-12-14/a-
murky-deal-a-195-stake-rosneft-has-been-sold;	https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
analizy/2016-10-12/pseudoprywatyzacja-rosnieft-przejmuje-basznieft	
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Rosneft	and	its	CEO,	Putin’s	close	friend,	Igor	Sechin,	are	the	undoubted	ben-
eficiaries	of	these	operations.	The	company	has	strengthened	its	position	as	the	
leader	of	the	Russian	oil	sector,	and	Sechin	has	demonstrated	his	strong	position	
in	the	government	elite.	The real goal of the ‘privatisation’, which	is	tradi-
tionally	associated	with	building	a	liberal	market	economy,	is	thus	in Russian 
conditions temporarily obtaining budget revenues without upsetting the 
state control of the assets, and strengthening the influence and increasing 
the incomes of the circles with close links to the Kremlin. 
President Putin’s official stance on the desirable direction of change has 
not yet been fully formulated and	will	most	likely	depend	on	the	programmes	
that	will	be	presented	in	2017	by	the	numerous	advisory	bodies.	He	has	rather	
enigmatically	appealed	for	“new	sources	of	growth	to	be	found”	and	for	struc-
tural	reforms,	while	macroeconomic	stability	is	maintained80,	clearly	opposing	
moves	that	could	stimulate	inflation.	At	the	moment,	Putin’s	preferences	can	
be	determined	by	the	shape	of	the	budget	for	2017–2019,	assuming	significant	
cuts	in	government	spending	(to	16.2%	of	GDP	in	2019	against	19.8%	of	GDP	in	
2016).	This	plan	also	assumes	a	gradual	reduction	of	the	budget	deficit	to	1.2%	
of	GDP	and	financing	the	missing	income	above	all	by	way	of	domestic	loans81.	
This	most	likely	will	not	only	fail	to	improve	the	situation	of	most	business	
circles	in	Russia,	it	may	even	adversely	affect	it.	Banks	will	be	more	willing	to	
buy	treasury	bonds	rather	than	to	grant	loans	to	private	companies,	especially	
small	and	medium-sized	ones.	
The intensification of the discussion on reform and the fact that it is con-
ducted on various platforms are intended to perform mainly a political 
function – to	calm	down	public	sentiment	and	to	convince	the	public,	including	
business	circles,	that	government	policy	is	not	a	cause	of	the	crisis	but	rather	
a	remedy	to	the	economic	problems.	The	debate	is	thus	aimed	at	adding	credibil-
ity	to	the	Kremlin’s	pseudo-reformative	ambitions	and	at	preparing	the	widest	
possible	spectrum	of	proposals	to	select	content	for	Vladimir	Putin’s	election	
manifesto	in	2018.	In	turn,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	discussions	are	aimed	at	devel-
oping	a	comprehensive	reform	agenda	that	would	upset	the	current	governance	
model,	though	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	the	government	is	ready	to	implement	
80	 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51996
81	 According	to	the	deputy	president	of	the	Central	Bank,	Ksenia	Yudaeva	(statement	at	the	
Gaidar	Forum	in	January	2016),	Russia’s	public	debt	–	considering	its	service	costs	–	should	
not	exceed	25–30%	of	GDP	(thus	double	the	present	level	and	half	what	is	considered	a	safe	
level	in	developed	countries).
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selective	partial	changes,	on	the	one	hand	to	mask	their	lack	of	will	to	rebuild	
the	entire	model,	and	on	the	other	to	temporarily	help	alleviate	the	most	severe	
signs	of	the	crisis.	This	selection	based	on	half	measures	has,	however,	more	
in	common	with	wishful	thinking	than	with	a	rational	agenda.	For	systemic	
reasons	the	limited	nature	of	pseudo-reforms	may	lead	only	to	them	proving	
ineffective.
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Iv. IS ruSSIa aT rISK oF a polITIcal crISIS? – 
an aTTEmpTEd ForEcaST
As	the	crisis	continues,	it	is	becoming	clear	that	–	mainly	due	to	the	pessimistic	
forecasts	concerning	oil	prices	–	it is impossible to return to the extensive 
economic governance model that	would	guarantee	high	incomes	without	de-
velopment	based	on	innovation.	According	to	the	forecast	published	in	Octo-
ber	2016	by	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development,	by	2035	average	annual	
economic	growth	will	not	exceed	2%,	while	people’s	real	incomes	will	reach	
2013	levels	only	in	202182.	This	poses	the	risk	of	a	serious	and	durable	deteriora-
tion	of	people’s	living	standards.	
However, the Russian elite will avoid comprehensive and politically risky 
reforms at any price, choosing	instead	temporary,	feigned	and	selective	tacti-
cal	anti-crisis	moves	that	will	boil	down	to	neutralising the risk for the sys-
tem in the period leading up to the presidential election scheduled	for	2018.	
This	strategy	has	been	adopted	most	likely	due	to	hope of a gradual increase in 
oil prices which	will	be	possible	to	capitalise	on	politically	in	view	of	the	elec-
tion	and	also	due	to	hope that the economic sanctions will be lifted by	the	
West	(even	though	Russia	has	not	made	any	concessions	as	regards	the	Ukrain-
ian	issue),	which	would	cause	a	return	of	investors	to	Russia	and	an	ameliora-
tion	of	the	consequences	of	the	crisis	through	the	influx	of	cheap	money.	In	case	
the	situation	develops	in	a	way	that	is	beneficial	for	Moscow,	these	two	factors	
may	slightly	alleviate	the	economic	problems	but	this	will	not	help	overcome	
their	primary	causes,	and	thus	will	not	in	themselves	create	the	foundations	
for	sustainable	growth.	Focusing on temporary measures is clear proof of 
the Russian government’s helplessness in the face of strategic challenges. 
Even though the government’s tactic of preservation is	unable	to	success-
fully	reverse	the	stagnation	trend	in	the	Russian	economy	(which	will	in	the	
long	term	adversely	affect	the	interests	of	both	society	and	the	broad	elite	cir-
cles),	paradoxically, it stands a big chance of success in the socio-political 
dimension, at least by the time of the presidential election which is viewed 
as key for the stability of the system. Neither	the	elites	of	various	levels	in	the	
broad	meaning	of	the	term	nor	the	public	–	though	for	different	reasons	–	are	in-
terested	in	hard	system	reforms.	Thus,	despite	the	deteriorating	socio-economic	
82	 https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/10/20/661689-20-let-stagnatsii.	By	
comparison,	GDP	grew	by	4%	and	4.3%	respectively	in	2010	and	2011	after	the	crisis,	more	
than	compensating	for	the	fall	in	2009.
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situation,	the	Kremlin	elite	feels	no	pressure	on	the	domestic	arena.	At	the	same	
time,	there	is	no	reform	pressure	on	Moscow	from	the	international	environ-
ment,	both	due	to	the	partial	self-isolation	policy	the	Russian	government	has	
been	adopting	since	2014,	and	the	high	resistance	of	the	Russian	public	to	dis-
course	promoting	so-called	Euro-Atlantic	values	(democracy,	pluralism	and	
a	liberal	market	economy).	Furthermore,	it	seems	that	the	West	is	increasingly	
prepared	to	accept	the	distinctness	of	the	Russian	political	system	and	is	focus-
ing	on	limiting	the	negative	effects	of	Moscow’s	aggressive	foreign	policy.	
Above all, despite serious financial problems, the government has great 
possibilities to obtain money for the budget by the time of the presidential 
election (unless	oil	prices	suddenly	plummet	or	other	serious	external	turbu-
lences	occur).	According	to	the	government’s	calculations	made	in	mid-2016,	
total	funds	kept	in	both	reserve	funds	(the	Reserve	Fund	and	the	National	Wel-
fare	Fund)	will	be	sufficient	at	least	until	2019.	This	will	allow	the	government	
to	finance	the	deficit,	while	simultaneously	increasing	the	public	debt.	Priority	
expenses	(temporary	financial	injections	applied	as	needed	to	various	spheres	
of	the	economy,	while	the	austerity	policy	is	maintained	in	general)	will	most	
likely	be	manually	controlled.	The	government	may	resort	to	further	cautious	
social	cuts	(for	example,	the	future	of	pension	indexation	is	uncertain)	as	well	
as	cautious	and	selective	improvements	of	the	efficiency	of	disbursing	budget	
funds,	including	a	partial	curbing	of	the	scale	of	corruption	(while	maintaining	
financial	support	to	the	section	of	the	elite	closest	to	the	Kremlin).	It	may	also	re-
duce	spending	on	state	investments,	amend	the	fiscal	law,	and	maintain	the	low	
rouble	exchange	rate,	although	this	will	make	entrepreneurs’	situation	more	
difficult83.	Although the austerity strategy may generate political risks in	
the	period	leading	up	to	the	election,	apparently,	it has been recognised –	at	
least	temporarily	–	as nevertheless less dangerous to the government elite 
than the implementation of structural reforms. 
The likelihood of a revolt among the elite or	a	‘palace	coup’	that	might	lead	to	
a	real	reconstruction	of	the	existing	government	and	ownership	model	is	low.	
Even	though	both	the	economic	crisis	and	the	Western	sanctions	have	adversely	
83	 The	average	annual	rouble	to	dollar	exchange	rate	assumed	in	the	budget	for	2016	was	63.3.	
Meanwhile,	the	budget	for	2017–2019	assumes	that	the	average	exchange	rate	will	be	67.5–
71.1.	In	a	survey	commissioned	by	the	Central	Bank,	69%	of	businesspeople	expressed	an	in-
terest	in	a	strong	rouble	to	reduce	the	cost	of	the	imports	necessary	for	modernisation.	Con-
trary	to	the	government’s	opinion,	none	of	them	believed	that	the	weak	rouble	exchange	
rate	was	beneficial.	Укрепление	рубля	обеспокоило	российские	власти,	20	 July	2016,	
www.vedomosti.ru	
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affected	the	financial	situation	of	the	Russian	elite	both	directly	(reducing	the	
value	of	their	assets)	and	indirectly	(limiting	their	opportunities	to	further	
build	their	fortunes)84,	the	kleptocratic	style	of	exercising	power	preferred	by	
it	requires	the	existing	model	of	governance	to	remain	in	place.	Furthermore,	
Vladimir	Putin	is	viewed	by	the	elite	as	the	only	guarantor	of	balancing	the	
influence	between	the	various	interest	groups	and	–	though	to	a	lesser	extent	
than	before	–	of	maintaining	their	personal	fortunes85.	The	supremacy	of	the	law	
enforcement	agencies	in	the	system,	which	perform	preventive	and	repressive	
functions	in	dealing	with	real	and	potential	opponents	of	the	Kremlin,	along	
with	the	lack	of	an	alternative	leader	and	an	alternative	system	that	would	
guarantee	that	the	elite	would	maintain	their	power	and	property,	means	that	
the	elite	still	binds	their	careers	to	the	centralised,	paternalistic	Putin	model.	
Even	the	austerity	policy	adopted	by	the	government	due	to	the	crisis	has	not	
changed	this	attitude.	It	does	not	rule	out	that	the	existing	lobbying	system	
will	remain	in	place.	In	this	system,	individual	interest	groups	inside	the	elite	
are	fighting	for	lucrative	financial	contracts	financed	by	the	state	budget.	The	
new	financial	reality	is	intensifying	the	rivalry	for	favours	from	the	Kremlin,	
which	ever	more	cautiously	distributes	them.	However,	this	will	most	likely	
only	induce	the	higher	level	elite	to	demonstrate	loyalty	to	the	presidential	cen-
tre.	At	the	same	time,	the	intensifying	rivalry	for	sources	of	income	may	lead	
to	a	further	degeneration	of	the	state	governance	model	on	the	various	levels	
of	the	bureaucratic	machine.	
The reasons for the low likelihood of public rebellion against the govern-
ment are slightly different.	The	predominant	need	for	stabilisation	and	the	
unwillingness	to	take	risks	are	partly	an	effect	of	the	memory	of	the	traumatic	
period	of	transformation	in	the	1990s	and	they	strongly	dampen	the	desire	
for	system	reforms.	People’s	behaviour	is	affected	by	the high degree of eco-
nomic and psychological dependence on the state. Over	60	million	people,	
and	thus	almost	half	of	the	population,	directly	financially	rely	on	the	budget	
84	 For	example,	the	19	richest	Russian	oligarchs,	according	to	Bloomberg	agency,	lost	US$8	bil-
lion	in	2015	(in	2014,	their	losses	exceeded	US$50	billion)	to	a	great	extent	as	a	consequence	
of	the	Western	sanctions	(then	the	losses	were	partly	offset	owing	to	increasing	oil	prices);	
https://life.ru/t/%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%83%D0%BA/852187,	29	December	2015.
85	 The	state’s	difficult	financial	situation	will	most	likely	force	the	government	to	partly	curb	
corruption	and	limit	it	to	a	selected	circle	of	entities	recognised	by	the	Kremlin	as	necessary	
for	stability	of	the	system.	One	example	of	the	partial	reshuffle	inside	the	elite	under	the	
slogan	of	combating	corruption	were	the	arrests	of	officers	of	the	Investigative	Committee	
and	Federal	Customs	Service	conducted	by	the	FSB	in	the	middle	of	2016.	
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mechanisms	of	the	redistribution	of	incomes	(43	million	pensioners	and	around	
20	million	people	employed	by	the	public	sector,	including	employees	of	state-
owned	companies86).	This	dependence	becomes	stronger	during	a	crisis	and	
when	people’s	incomes	are	shrinking.	This	translates	into	a	paternalistic	men-
tality	and	approach.	Over	70%	of	the	population	believe	that	society	cannot	
function	without	state	support,	and	only	9%	believe	that	citizens	should	take	
care	of	themselves,	show	initiative.	Even	though	people	do	see	the	defects	of	the	
system,	53%	of	them	believe	that	personal	interventions	from	the	most	senior	
state	officials	are	the	most	effective	method	of	crisis	management.	This	means	
that	the	government	itself	is	in	fact	the	only	instance	to	which	complaints	can	
be	made	against	its	own	errors	and	negligence.	Hence	most	likely	the	predomi-
nant	belief	that	the	country	will	cope	with	the	crisis,	and	the	government	has	
a	good	action	plan87.	People	do	not	thus	seem	to	notice	the	fact	that	the	govern-
ment	itself	has	worsened	Russia’s	economic	situation	(for	instance,	by	bringing	
the	country	into	international	isolation	as	a	result	of	the	Kremlin’s	geopolitical	
ambitions).	Nor	do	they	seem	to	notice	the	many	feigned	anti-crisis	measures	
taken	by	the	government	becoming	separate	sources	of	crisis	phenomena,	while	
the	main	beneficiaries	of	the	budget	support	is	the	narrow	elite	circle	and	not	
the	Russian	public.	This	means	that	the	awareness	of	the	crisis	and	intensifying	
social	and	existential	problems	have	no	negative	impact	on	public	support	levels	
for	the	government—in	January	2017	over	a	half	of	the	respondents	were	con-
vinced	that	their	country	was	heading	in	the	right	direction,	and	85%	praised	
Putin’s	activity	as	the	president88.	The	relatively	mild	way	in	which	the	present	
crisis	is	developing	is	also	important	(concerns	about	an	economic	collapse	that	
appeared	at	the	beginning	of	2015	have	proven	to	be	unreasonable).
Furthermore,	the	real	monopolisation	of	the	public	sphere	by	the	Kremlin’s	dis-
course	means	that	there are no alternative platforms to the state for form-
ing and demonstrating collective identity, values	and	interests	on	a	large	
scale.	The	identity	vacuum	after	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	the	political	and	eco-
nomic	turbulences	in	the	1990s,	and	the	lack	of	an	appealing	project	of	a	modern	
Russia	have	all	made	the	Russian	public	retreat	into	the	safe	and	familiar	Soviet	
86	 OECD	data	for	2011.
87	 Государство	нам	поможет,	2	July	2016,	http://politcom.ru/21251.html	
88	 http://www.levada.ru.	 Paradoxically,	 even	 the	 ostentatious	 destruction	 of	 Western	 food	
covered	 by	 the	 embargo	 in	 summer	 2015	 did	 not	 provoke	 a	 revolt.	 For	 details	 see:	Maria	
Domańska,	Katarzyna	Chawryło,	The	Kremlin	 steps	up	 the	fight	 against	 contraband	 food-
stuffs,	 12	 August	 2015,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-08-12/krem-
lin-steps-fight-against-contraband-foodstuffs
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and	superpower	models	affirmed	by	the	state.	Compensation	myths	(the	revival	
of	a	‘great	Russia’	as	a	result	of	confrontation	with	the	West)89	make	it	easier	to	
accept	the	financial	and	existential	difficulties.	
There	are	also	strong	psychological and institutional mechanisms limiting 
the protest potential and processes of self-organisation to fight for group 
interests. The	fact	that	people	are	focused	on	survival	in	the	conditions	of	crisis	
and	their	lack	of	faith	that	they	could	influence	the	government’s	policy	discour-
age	them	from	being	politically	active	and	facilitate	populist	moves.	Another	
factor	that	discourages	protests	are	repressive	measures	skilfully	dosed	by	the	
government90.	Survival	strategies	are	predominantly	individual	or	limited	to	
a	narrow	circle	of	the	closest	people	(family,	less	frequently	friends).	They	do	
not	extend	to	local	neighbourhood	circles	or	professional	groups	mainly	due	
to	the	historically	conditioned	atomisation	of	society.	Along	with	the	lack	of	
an	appealing	alternative	to	the	existing	model,	this	means	that	citizens’ eco-
nomic problems will most likely not be crystallised into political demands 
or even massive economic claims addressed	to	the	government.	The	widely	
shared	belief	that	the	crisis	has	mainly	been	caused	by	external	factors	addi-
tionally	suppresses	the	need	for	change.	
The economic crisis alone will not thus be a catalyst for any major political 
change in Russia. The	way	the	parliamentary	election	was	held	in	September	
2016	proves	that	there	are	no	threats	to	the	system’s	stability.	The	deteriora-
tion	of	the	socio-economic	situation	has	not	become	a	platform	for	mobilising	
the	public	against	the	‘party	of	power’,	United	Russia,	or	the	Kremlin.	The	low-
est	voter	turnout	in	the	Russian	Federation’s	history	proved	the	success	of	the	
government’s	strategy	aimed	at	discouraging	the	public	from	participation	in	
political	life	and	convincing	them	that	there	is	no	alternative	to	the	existing	
system91.	
89	 One	example	of	this	mechanism	is	Russians’	attitude	to	the	food	embargo,	formed	mainly	
by	the	propaganda	in	the	mass	media,	which	runs	counter	to	the	everyday	experience	of	
consumers.	Although	increasing	numbers	of	respondents	expressed	a	negative	opinion	on	
the	embargo	in	the	middle	of	2016	(the	percentage	of	negative	opinions	increased	from	23%	
in	2015	to	31%),	upholding	the	embargo	as	a	response	to	Western	sanctions	was	opposed	by	
only	12%.	Граждане	устали	от	антисанкций,	11	July	2016,	www.ng.ru
90	 For	more	information,	see	Jan	Strzelecki,	op. cit.
91	 For	more	information,	see	Maria	Domańska,	The	parliamentary	election	in	Russia:	a	dem-
onstration	of	 the	Kremlin’s	power,	21	September	2016,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/analyses/2016-09-21/parliamentary-election-russia-a-demonstration-kremlins-
power
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Despite	the	government’s	successes	so	far,	there are still some risks to the 
government elite, mainly linked to possible mistakes in diagnosing and 
predicting the social situation. Official	statistics	fails	to	fully	reflect	the	real	
picture	due	to	the	methodology	used	and	defects	in	the	information	gathering	
system92,	the	significant	scale	of	the	grey	economy	(as	much	as	40%	of	GDP93),	
and	also	the	level	of	hidden	unemployment94.	Nor	can	it	be	ruled	out	that	region-
al	elites	intentionally	conceal	inconvenient	information	due	to	their	particular	
political	interests.	This	makes	it	more	difficult	to	formulate	a	consistent	diag-
nosis,	especially	given	the	fact	that	the	macroeconomic	situation	in	the	Russian	
regions	is	strongly	differentiated95.	The	Russian	public’s	attitudes	and	reactions	
are	not	fully	predictable,	either.	They	may	be	radicalised,	for	example,	when	the	
savings	made	at	the	time	of	prosperity	(which	are	a	kind	of	‘security	valve’	and	
decrease	the	level	of	public	dissatisfaction	in	the	face	of	the	crisis)	run	out96.
The risks may grow after the presidential election and will be linked above 
all with the exhaustion of budget reserves that	have	so	far	facilitated	the	neu-
tralisation	of	the	effects	of	the	crisis	through	selective	social	measures	and	sup-
port	for	selected	branches	of	the	economy.	When	this	happens,	the	likelihood	
of	radical	cuts	in	spending	and	the	maximisation	of	budget	revenues	(partly	
through	raising	taxes97)	will	be	greater.	This	will	lead	to	a	significant	deteriora-
92	 For	example,	the	statistics	concerning	the	level	of	remuneration	takes	into	account	only	large	
and	medium-sized	companies	employing	around	46%	of	all	workers.	In	the	remaining	compa-
nies	(the	sector	of	small	and	micro	companies),	the	wages	might	be	10–15%	lower.	Основная	
при	чина	 бедности	 –	 инфляция,	 http://www.newizv.ru/economics/2016-03-17/235975-
direktor-instituta-socialnoj-politiki-niu-vshe-lilija-ovcharova.html.	Furthermore,	statistics	
might	be	distorted	due	to	unreliable	data	provided	by	companies	(partly	resulting	from	their	
being	unfamiliar	with	reporting	standards).	Depending	on	the	methodology	applied,	conclu-
sions	concerning	the	country’s	socio-economic	condition	may	significantly	change.	See	for	
example,	Промышленность	выплеснула	рост,	18	July	2016,	www.kommersant.ru
93	 Н.	Акиндинова,	Я.	Кузьминов,	Е.	Ясин,	op. cit. 
94	 According	 to	 experts’	 estimates,	 over	30%	Russians	 are	 looking	 for	 a	 job	or	 an	opportu-
nity	 to	 earn	 additional	 money,	 regardless	 of	 the	 officially	 low	 unemployment	 rate.	 За-
маскированная	безработица	шагает	по	стране,	22	June	2016,	http://www.ng.ru/econo-
mics/2016-06-22/1_job.html
95	 This	concerns,	for	example,	significant	disproportions	in	the	wages,	costs	of	living,	struc-
ture	and	size	of	regional	GDP.	Занятость,	доходы	и	личное	потребление:	региональные	
различия,	июнь	2016,	http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/9465.pdf
96	 At	the	beginning	of	2016,	only	slightly	more	than	25%	of	Russians	had	any	savings;	this	was	
the	worst	result	over	the	past	decade.	http://newsru.com/finance/31mar2016/ruhshldssav-
ings.html,	31 March	2016.
97	 In	autumn	2016,	President	Putin	announced	a	moratorium	on	raising	taxes	which	is	to	be	in	
force	 until	 2019.	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/09/23/658241-putin-
nalogi
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tion	of	people’s	financial	situation,	which	in	turn	will	require	the	development	
and	expansion	of	the	competences	of	the	repression	and	prevention	apparatus	
to	maintain	the	stability	of	the	system.	
Serious	political	consequences	cannot	be	ruled	out	either	if	the	government	
makes	relatively	small	errors.	These	are	highly	likely	in	an	excessively	central-
ised	and	bureaucratised	governance	system,	especially	during	a	crisis	when	an	
intensified	flexibility	of	reaction	is	required.
However, the strong ‘deep structures’ of the Russian state are an impor-
tant ‘trump card’ of the government elite. They	are	formed	by	the network	
of	informal	co-dependencies	based	on	the	widespread	penetration	of	the	official	
institutional	system	by	the	secret	services	and	bureaucracy.	Both	of	them	are	
strongly	developed	and	want	to	maximise	their	scope	of	competences	which	
would	hinder	any	substantial	reforms.	Thus	it	should	be	expected	that	even	if	
massive	public	protests	linked	to	the	crisis	take	place	and	even	if	formal	changes	
in	the	state	governance	model	are	implemented	and	state	institutions	improve	
their	effectiveness	to	a	certain	degree	(for	example,	in	the	context	of	budget	
mobilisation),	these	hidden	and	durable	mechanisms	will	contribute	to	a	real	
reproduction	of	the	system	in	place.	
The dynamic of the international situation may affect Russia’s condition in 
various ways during the crisis. There	are	many	unknown	factors	that	might	
destabilise	its	economic	situation.	These	include	above	all	the	uncertainty	sur-
rounding	the	further	trend	in	oil	prices	(the	main	factor	determining	the	rou-
ble’s	exchange	rate	and	the	position	of	Russian	assets	on	international	financial	
markets).	
Remaining	factors	include:	the	condition	of	the	Chinese	economy	affecting	the	
attractiveness	of	emerging	markets	(including	Russia)	in	investors’	eyes	and	
the	level	of	global	consumption	of	raw	materials	(the	main	export	goods	of	the	
Russian	Federation);	decisions	of	the	US	Federal	Reserve	(the	changes	of	the	base	
interest	rate	affect	the	exchange	rates	of	other	currencies	against	the	dollar	and	
oil	prices);	and,	finally,	the	economic	condition	of	the	European	Union,	the	main	
market	for	Russian	exports.	
In	turn,	political	factors	will	rather	work	for	the	benefit	of	Russia	and	its	posi-
tion	on	the	international	arena,	which	may	tangibly	expand	Moscow’s	room	for	
manoeuvre	as	regards	combating	recession	and	stagnation.	In	this	context,	the	
key	factors	will	be	the	future	balance	of	powers	in	the	European	Union	and	the	
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priorities	of	the	United	States’	foreign	policy.	As	the	Brexit	mechanism	is	un-
derway	and	Eurosceptic	and	pro-Russian	circles	in	Europe,	lobbying	to	warmer	
relations	with	Moscow,	gain	strength,	the	EU	crisis	may	result	in	a	gradual	
disassembly	of	the	sanctions	regime.	2017,	the	year	of	elections	in	France	and	
Germany,	will	be	decisive	in	this	context.	Donald	Trump’s	victory	in	the	US	
presidential	race	in	November	2016	may	lead	to	attempts	at	making	a	‘new	start’	
in	relations	with	Russia,	which	potentially	strengthens	the	Kremlin’s	position	
in	contacts	with	Washington.	
The	fear	of	destabilisation	in	Russia	is	a	factor	that	might	guide	Western	lead-
ers’	decisions	as	regards	policy	towards	Moscow;	this	should	not	be	underesti-
mated.	Regardless	of	the	fact	that	the	Kremlin	has	been	toughening	its	stance	
in	foreign	policy,	it	is	very	likely	that	the	West	will	offer	support	should	there	
be	a	serious	crisis	in	Russia	posing	the	risk	of	a	collapse	of	the	political	system.	
From	the	perspective	of	the	Western	capitals,	this	would	pose	an	existential	
threat	to	European	security	due	to	the	problem	of	control	over	the	Russian	nu-
clear	potential,	a	possible	reactivation	of	terrorism	in	Russia	or	uncontrolled	
migration.	It	cannot	thus	be	ruled	out	that	Moscow	will	deliberately	play	on	
this	threat	to	compel	Western	elites	to	participate	in	economic	and	financial	
co-operation,	regardless	of	the	Kremlin’s	unwillingness	to	make	any	conces-
sions	in	international	issues.	
However,	assuming	that	the	international	community	will	spare	Russia	serious	
turbulence	and	that	the	Russian	government	will	avoid	mistakes	that	might	
destabilise	the	country’s	socio-political	situation,	any	serious	threats	to	the	gov-
ernment	elite	appear	highly	unlikely.	At present, the most realistic scenario 
for Russia is long-term stagnation –	without	an	economic	collapse	but	also	
with	no	chance	for	real	growth. Russia will most likely continue to develop 
at a much slower rate than the rest of the world for many years98, and its 
backwardness as compared to the developed countries will become more 
pronounced. 
MARIA DOMAńSKA
98	 While	Russia	 is	 trying	to	overcome	the	recession,	 the	 IMF	forecasted	 in	October	2016	that	
the	 average	 economic	 growth	 worldwide	 will	 reach	 3.4%	 in	 2017;	 http://www.cnbc.
com/2016/07/19/imf-slashes-world-growth-forecasts-again-on-brexit-curveball.html,	
19	July	2016.	
